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Corporate Islam, Global Capitalism and the 
Performance of Economic Moralities 
 
 
Abstract 
Recent years have witnessed the rapid expansion of the Islamic economy, which by some 
estimates has reached a size of US$ 4 trillion. The growth of the Islamic economy presents 
an intriguing test case for the compatibility of global capitalism and moral – in this case 
specifically Islamic – principles. This article adopts a performative lens to draw attention 
to the role of the World Islamic Economic Forum and the Global Islamic Economy 
Summit as legitimation mechanisms celebrating economic diversity and the success of 
Muslim entrepreneurs with the aim of increasing the visibility of the Islamic economy. 
Here, a polyphony of Muslim voices is sought to be consolidated into the voice of 
‘business Islam’, with important implications for how the Islamic economy is conceived, 
defined and delineated.   
 
Key words: Islam; capitalism; global economic governance; identity economy; 
conference ethnography 
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Introduction 
Anyone walking the exhibition grounds in the London docklands in early November 2013 would 
have stumbled across a perhaps rather surprising sight: a large gathering of nearly 3000 
representatives from international business, government and civil society discussing, debating – if 
not outright celebrating – what could provocatively be termed ‘global capitalism/Muslim style’. 
The World Islamic Economic Forum had arrived in town. Hosted for the first time in its decade-
long existence outside a Muslim-majority country, its high-profile speakers included then UK 
prime minister David Cameron and London mayor Boris Johnson.1 The Forum, held under the 
motto of ‘Changing World, New Relationships’, was a crowning moment in the short history of 
what has been a rapid expansion of the Islamic economy. It was enthusiastically embraced by 
London’s political and business elites – with Islamic finance at its core.2 Yet, as I will discuss in 
this article, it also raises questions about recent efforts to align Islamic values with economic 
imperatives of competitiveness and success. To what extent do these efforts emulate existing 
economic discourses and practices and to what extent do they open up new pathways for the 
substantiation of alternative economies?  
  
Muslims distinguish between halal and haram or that what is permissible and that what is 
prohibited under Islam. In this sense, the sharia (broadly: Islamic law) articulates a number of 
principles, a code of behavior with which adherents of the faith should comply. Some of these 
principles – such as the prohibition of riba (interpreted as interest or usury) or the ban on 
consuming pork - clearly have economic consequences. Indeed, some observers go so far as to 
suggest that Islam could be seen as a foundation for the inclusion of morality and ethics in 
economies and markets. Others point to conceptual ambiguities and obstacles in the Islamic 
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economy project. Nevertheless, recent decades have seen renewed efforts to reorient economic 
activity towards the values of Islam in both Muslim-majority countries and among diaspora 
communities. 
 
In material terms, this Islamic economy is not trivial. A widely used estimate puts its current size 
at approximately US$4 trillion. This alone sets it apart from locally grounded conceptualisations 
of alternative economies such as perhaps most famously, the diverse economies/community 
economies articulated and performed by Gibson-Graham (2006). Similarly, its more 
systematically comprehensive approach, embracing multiple sectors ranging from Islamic finance 
to halal food and pharmaceuticals to modest fashion and family tourism as I will discuss below, 
differentiates it from sectoral pursuits such as the fair trade movement or social investment. Whilst 
its scalability and comprehensive approach make the Islamic economy distinctive as an alternative 
economy, this also poses a number of challenges when it comes to its normalization and 
legitimation as well as differentiation from mainstream markets. 
 
In this article, I will first discuss the emergence of this new Islamic economy and situate it vis-à-
vis existing Islamic global economic governance structures, in particular the Organisation for 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) framework.3 I will suggest that from the early 2000s onwards we see 
an increased entanglement of the Islamic economy and Islamic and conventional global economic 
governance arrangements. I will point to a number of problems and complications that arise when 
speaking about ‘the’ Islamic economy or a uniform voice of Islam. I will then look at two efforts 
to increase the visibility and voice of the Islamic economy: the World Islamic Economic Forum 
(WIEF) and the Global Islamic Economy Summit (GIES).  
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This article draws on participant observation at the 2013 and 2016 World Islamic Economic Forum 
as well as semi-structured interviews and unstructured practitioner conversations with policy 
makers, market actors and sharia experts, and content analyses of the State of the Global Islamic 
Economy Report (Thomson Reuters, all years).4 The importance of conferences and similar events 
in ‘shaping industries [and] creating professionals’ has become a core concern of recent 
ethnographic work (Leivestad and Nyqvist 2017; see also Brown et al. 2017; Sandler and Thedvall 
2017). And indeed, they can be seen as orchestrated spectacles through which new market forms 
are both instantiated and legitimated (Rethel 2018a).  
 
Everyday Islamic Economies and the Emergence of the Islamic Economy 
The ambition to build an Islamic economy was part of the Islamic revival of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Proponents of the Islamic economy envisaged implementing an economic system organised 
around Islamic values – prosperity for all, social justice and equity, but also clearly enforced 
property rights – and ideologically situated between the two major economic systems of the time, 
capitalism and communism (Hefner 2006; Siddiqui 2006).5 Four decades on, it is clear that the 
idea(l)s of an Islamic economy fell short of the economic and political realities on the ground. 
Attempts to Islamise the national economies of Iran, Pakistan and Sudan failed to bring about 
prosperous and more equitable economic systems, and at times exacerbated sectarian conflict. The 
idea of creating an Islamic Common Market, first mooted in 1974, was always seen to be more of 
a long-term aspiration rather than a concrete plan (Dabour 2004). Muslim actors struggled to 
overcome differences in the interpretation of Islamic economic principles across different schools 
of Islamic legal thought as well as the barriers imposed by Islamisation efforts wrapped up in 
nation-building projects (see, for example, Nasr 2001; El-Gamal 2006; Warde 2010).  
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Yet, if we look around us today, then we see Islamic economies appearing in more and less 
expected places. We could well imagine a Malay woman who works in the Kuala Lumpur office 
of the Islamic subsidiary of a UK bank, meets her friends for lunch at a US brand restaurant (halal-
certified and freshly Saudi-owned), reads about the new Ramadan lines of international fashion 
retailers Mango and Zara on a GCC fashion blog and then, using her Islamic credit card, books a 
package tour for herself and her family to explore the heritage trails of Islamic Spain.6 There are 
many similar examples that could be mentioned here. A change seems afoot which has led to 
renewed scholarly interest in the relationship between the economy and Islam and more 
specifically the incorporation of Islamic values in daily economic life.  
 
If we continue this Southeast Asian focus, then, for example, Patricia Sloane-White (2011; 2017) 
investigates how workplace practices and office spaces are being Islamicised in Malaysia giving 
rise to what she refers to as ‘corporate Islam’.7 Daromir Rudnyckyj (2010) studies how Islamic 
values are harnessed in post-Suharto Indonesia’s attempt to mobilise its workforce in the transition 
from a statist to a more neoliberal mode of production. More recently, Rudnyckyj (2013; 2014) 
has begun to explore how Malaysia is mobilising Islamic finance to position itself within new 
circuits of capital. Lena Rethel (2016) analyzes the role of Islamic finance in the financialisation 
of the Malaysian political economy, in particular set against the background of rising levels of 
household debt. Carla Jones (2010) explores fashion at the intersections of Islamic consumption 
and the emergence of an increasingly consumerist Islam in Indonesia (see also Fealy 2008). Last 
but not least, Johan Fischer (2008; 2011; 2016) looks at the halal industries of Malaysia and 
Singapore and the consumption practices of Muslim Southeast Asian diasporas. Similar dynamics 
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– where new forms of what Sarah Tobin (2016) calls ‘everyday piety’ take a decisively economic 
slant and in so doing increasingly provide a basis for global industries – have been observed in 
other parts of the world (see for example Bergeaud-Blackler et al. 2016; Gökariksel and Secor 
2009; Lewis 2013, 2015; Maurer 2006; Roy and Boubekeur 2012; to name but a few).  
 
Indeed, an Islamic ‘identity economy’ seems to be in the process of emergence where – to 
paraphrase Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff’s (2009, 1) Ethnicity Inc. - religion is becoming 
‘more corporate, more commodified, more implicated in the economics of everyday life’.8 What 
we can witness, instead of the emergence of one Islamic economic system unifying the Islamic 
world, is the emergence of everyday Islamic economies – of work and production, of finance and 
consumption - as Muslims around the world seek to reconcile faith and everyday economic life. 
Moreover, these everyday Islamic economies are not bound by national borders – they are 
intentionally outward facing and increasingly shaped by, but also reshaping global flows of people, 
money, goods and ideas (cf. Appadurai 1990). What we can observe is an Islamic identity economy 
project - or even projects as differences between the World Islamic Economic Forum and Global 
Islamic Economy Summit that will be discussed below will show - that is inherently fragmented, 
at times contradictory but nevertheless aspiring to become global in scale. Islam has become big 
business. 
 
Mainstream social science knows very little about the principles - economic, religious, social and 
political - according to which these economies operate, let alone how they are governed. Indeed, 
the term Islamic economy itself can be ambiguous. On the one hand, it refers to economic activity 
which is conducted in compliance with Islamic law and therefore distinguishes between halal 
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(permissible) and haram (prohibited) products and activities. Examples of the latter are the 
prohibition of riba (interest) in the Islamic finance sector or the ban on pork products in the halal 
production of food, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. I will call this the narrow definition. On the 
other hand, the term is also used to refer to a far wider range of products and services targeted at 
Muslim consumers, such as family tourism, modest fashion or news media. I will call this the 
broader definition. 
 
Figure 1: Size of the Global Islamic Economy by Industry (US$ billion) 
 
Note: grey shares are estimates for halal certified [food]; Muslim friendly [tourism]; purchased by Muslim women 
[fashion]. 
Source: adapted from Thomson Reuters (2016: 7) 
 
Figure 1 gives an idea of the size of this economy and its main sectors. I will return to this figure 
and what it represents later on. Suffice to say for now that there exists quite a sizeable Islamic 
economy drawing in a growing universe of countries.9  
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Figure 2: Country Ranking according to Global Islamic Economy Indicator 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters (2016: 12) 
 
As figure 2 indicates, its central nodes are not necessarily the nodes we would primarily associate 
with being political and/or intellectual centers of Islamic authority in the Muslim world (see, for 
example, Bano and Sakurai 2015). However, they are also ambiguously situated within networks 
of economic power and thus speak moreover to attempts to globalize international political 
economy analyses by moving beyond a narrow focus on mainly advanced industrialised and 
Western countries (Phillips 2005). Until recently, they have developed largely outside existing 
global economic governance frameworks.  
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Limitations of the OIC as a Framework for Islamic Economic Cooperation 
Ever since the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim voices have played a rather marginal role 
in ‘global governance’, especially when it comes to global economic governance (Ameli 2011). If 
we look at the construction of the post-World War Two international order, then it either preceded 
the independence and/or creation of most countries with Muslim-majority populations or their 
international involvement. Of the 44 countries that negotiated the Bretton Woods Agreement, only 
three were Muslim-majority populated: Egypt, Iran and Iraq (see also Helleiner 2014). However, 
it might be of even greater relevance that ‘Islam’ just was not an important signifier in the 
international relations of the time (see, for example,  Sukarno 1955). This was to begin to change 
over the course of the 1960s, culminating in the creation of the OIC in 1969. The absence of 
‘Muslim voices’ was exacerbated by a lack of material influence of Muslim-majority countries 
until at least the oil shocks of the 1970s. The OIC then served as a platform for the creation of the 
Islamic Development Bank in 1975, followed by the establishment of the Statistical, Economic 
and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC) and of the Islamic 
Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (ICCI) in the same decade. The Committee for 
Commercial and Economic Cooperation (COMCEC) of the OIC was created in 1981 and became 
operational in 1984. The Islamic Centre for the Development of Trade (ICDT) was also established 
in 1981 (Choudhury 1989; Dabour 2004).  
 
Overall, the OIC framework has not played a significant role in fostering economic cooperation 
among its member countries, let alone in facilitating the development of Islamic economies. The 
OIC exhibits great variety within the composition of its member states with regard to size and 
characteristics of both populations and economies. It embodies a type of closed multilateralism 
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with religious identity (‘Muslim majority’) as the common marker as exemplified by the OIC 
charter. Moreover, as Dabour (2004, 81) points out, the ‘group of OIC countries is very mixed in 
terms of its regional and international relations and commitments’. Historically, this was clearly 
reflected in the limited importance that member countries attached to the OIC – as signaled by the 
(in)frequency of meetings, the lack of a concrete common agenda and the rather limited resources 
made available to the OIC and its subsidiaries and affiliated bodies.10  
 
What we see from the early 2000s onwards, however, is a growing enmeshment between these 
emerging Islamic economies, broader/secular/conventional global economic governance 
arrangements and actors operating within the OIC framework, in particular the IDB. Indeed, we 
should remember that at the time – following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the waging of the ‘War 
on Terror’ - Islamic finance was under severe strain which led to renewed efforts to integrate it 
with the global financial architecture (Warde 2007; Rethel 2011). One example would be the 
creation of the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) in 2002.11 The IFSB was set up to develop 
capital adequacy rules for Islamic financial institutions, serving a role equivalent to that fulfilled 
by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision in the conventional finance space (Rethel 2011, 
88-89). On the one hand, the IFSB meets a functional need of the expanding Islamic financial 
services industry; obviously, without Islamic finance, there would be no need for an IFSB. On the 
other hand, however, this need is formatted by existing global economic governance arrangements, 
in this case the development of an international capital adequacy regime (the ‘Basel Accords’) 
from the late 1980s onwards.  
 
11 
 
The second example is perhaps even more striking. I have already mentioned the Islamic 
Development Bank. Historically, the impact of the IDB in international development lending has 
been rather small (Mannan 1988)12; indeed, it has been so marginal that IDB often does not even 
warrant a chapter of its own in books on multilateral development banks (or if yes a rather short 
one, see for instance Lessambo 2015; Park and Strand 2016). Part of this is because IDB’s 
financing capacity was limited by being funded from shareholder equity (IDBG 2013, 21). This 
changed in 2003, when IDB began issuing sukuk (Islamic capital market instruments akin to 
conventional bonds but in compliance with sharia). Raising funds in the capital market allowed 
IDB to move towards a leveraged lending model similar to that commonly practiced by (other) 
multilateral development banks (Park and Strand 2016).13 Note however that with a ceiling of 125 
per cent of authorised capital, IDB maintains a conservative leverage profile compared, for 
example, to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, whose gearing ratios exceed 300 per cent (Moody’s 2016, 8). Nevertheless, 
raising funds in capital markets entails further integration of the IDB in the international financial 
architecture, for example via the mechanism of credit rating (see Sinclair 2005).  
 
Against the background of this increased integration of Islamic economies and Islamic economic 
actors with existing global economic governance arrangements, an important question to ask is on 
whose terms – ideational, political, economic - does this integration take place?14 In this regard, 
we should study carefully not just these (more systemic) intersections, but also the concrete shape 
and quality of (social) interactions.  
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Analytical Problems and Conceptual Challenges 
What lies behind the recent growth and increased visibility of Islamic economies? Hefner (2006, 
16) reminds us that ‘Islam is among the most market-friendly of all the world religions’. To some 
extent, of course, Islamic economies have existed since at least the medieval period and the 
beginnings of Islam. Just think of the production, exchange and consumption of halal chicken (then 
probably all within one household economy). This very simple act, however, has come to take on 
quite a different significance. Thus nowadays, the ‘producer’ of halal chicken would have to 
undergo specific training and have their production process inspected and certified. The chicken 
would be packaged and an official halal label be attached, before the chicken is shipped for export 
(most likely from a non-Muslim to a Muslim-majority country).15 It would then be put on the halal 
shelf in a supermarket (which in itself might be subject to halal management processes to warrant 
such a designation), be bought by the ‘Muslim consumer’, processed and eaten (or left in the fridge, 
spoil and be thrown away – we leave the precise moral configurations open for now).  
 
The example provokes further questions about what type of markets we are talking about and what 
determines demand for and supply of Islamic products and services. In this regard, recent work on 
the ‘moralisation of the market’, which highlights both the growing prevalence and ambiguity of 
moral market claims, may be instructive. Thus, Stehr et al. (2006) point to the move from ‘supply 
and demand’ to ‘production and consumption’ as an important conceptual development. It clearly 
resonates with the above example. More generally and drawing on a wider reading of the literature, 
we can derive at least three different understandings of the Islamic/halal economy, which do not 
always sit comfortably against each other. 
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Islamic/halal economy as consumer segmentation 
This first understanding of the Islamic/halal economy is most closely attached to notions of 
demand and consumption. Stehr et al. (2006, 2) argue that because of greater affluence people ‘can 
afford to be and purchase what they perceive to be morally right’. Moral markets are thus 
reconstituted as part of the identity economies of affluent (segments of) societies, where identities 
are realised in and through economic practice (Jones 2010, Rudnyckyj 2014, Tobin 2016; see also 
Veblen 1899; Galbraith 1958; Sayer 2003). Thus, if Robert Hefner could write in 2005 that ‘many 
of the consumption habits promoted by global markets are seen as antithetical to Muslim ethical 
traditions’ (p. 21), then this is now turned on its head and we are confronted with the puzzling 
situation where Islamic values are to be realised precisely through consumption – with all the 
contradictions this entails (see also Rudnyckyj 2017).  
 
Islamic/halal economy as regime of standards and certification  
The second understanding of the Islamic/halal economy is more closely linked to the dimension 
of supply and production. Johan Fischer (2016) has shown how halal has developed into an 
increasingly complex regime of certification – where various standard setting bodies compete with 
each other for recognition. However, this is not just restricted to struggles within the Islamic 
economy. Thus, for example Bill Maurer (2006) suggests that other markers, such as standardised 
loan documentation in the case of Islamic mortgage finance, bestow credibility on Islamic 
products. It can also involve a rescaling of authority as in the case of the certification of Islamic 
financial products by sharia scholars, variably located vis-à-vis firms’ organizational structures, 
domestic state apparatus and international governance arrangements (Rethel 2018b). A common 
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question that arises within this literature is how this standardisation of the Islamic economy 
delineates the scope of deliberation and moral and economic reasoning.16 
 
Islamic/halal economy as normative space 
Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, thus, points to a third, more expansive understanding. For her, ‘halal 
as normative space is to be considered in its liveliness, with its rules of production and 
reproduction, its representations and practices’ (2015, 15, my translation).17  This space is not 
fixed, but malleable; symbolic rather than (purely) religious. It is without question that this more 
nuanced, multifaceted approach to the Islamic/halal economy complicates matters. Can we then 
speak of global capitalism/Muslim style?  
 
A further caution is in order. Vincent Cornell (2007, xi), borrowing from Fanon, suggests that 
Muslims are ‘overdetermined from without’. He continues that ‘the Muslim is made to feel 
personally responsible for a contradictory variety of “Islamic” moral values, “Islamic” cultural 
expressions, and “Islamic” religious and political doctrines’. Cornell cites the example of the 
Muslim restaurant owner in Russia who has to refer to his restaurant as ‘Georgian’ to stay in 
business. But then, in Cornell’s own attempt to allow ‘voices of Islam’ to be expressed, the 
economy is remarkably absent as a category for reflection. 18 
 
I have frequently encountered similar debates in my research on Islamic finance where participants 
were asking whether one should keep to the term of Islamic finance and continue to make use of 
Arabic words to specify various contracts, or whether it would not be more beneficial to drop the 
‘I-word’ and focus on the ‘value proposition’ instead. On the other end of the spectrum are calls 
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to transpose the various Islamic economies into one Islamic economic system with the aim to 
strengthen its Islamic quality, authenticity and coherence. In this sense, there exists a polyphony 
of Muslim voices, but this does not mean that they all have the same visibility, recognition and 
impact. In this regard, ‘corporate Islam’ as employed in this article is yet another rather ambiguous 
concept, on the one hand describing a ‘modern’ Islam in suit and tie (cf. Ling 2004), and on the 
other hand an Islamicisation of business practices with prayer rooms as part of office designs, strict 
rules for the interaction of male and female employees, and head scarves as part of the dress 
uniform (Sloane-White 2011; 2017; Tobin 2016).19 
 
Indeed, what the emergence and expansion of Islamic economies indicate is that rather than asking 
questions about the characteristics of global capitalism, Muslim-style or other, we should turn our 
attention to how global capitalism is being made and remade. In this regard, the ‘incorporation of 
identity’ and the ‘commodification of difference’ are two important markers (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2009). One avenue to explore in this regard is the question of how these Islamic 
economies are becoming – or perhaps more emphatically are being made - part of the mainstream 
(for the case of Islamic finance, see for example Rethel 2011). Global governance arrangements 
play a role in this as they normalise and entrench specific ways of conducting economic relations, 
among states, but also increasingly between states and business and even among businesses (not 
to speak of wider societal relations) (cf. Strange 1996; McGrew and Held 2002). They thus play a 
constitutive rather than purely regulative function and we should interrogate further the 
relationship between global governance and market-making in its multiple forms. 
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This is where it might be instructive to examine efforts to increase the visibility and voice of the 
Islamic economy. The following two sections will look at two such efforts in particular: the World 
Islamic Economic Forum, organised under the auspices of Malaysian leadership, and the Global 
Islamic Economy Summit, held annually in Dubai. Both Malaysia and Dubai suffered significant 
financial and economic crises, in the late 1990s, respectively 2000s. In both countries, the 
development of the Islamic economy is part of a strategy to diversify the economy and increase 
national competitiveness. However, it also reflects a desire to become more involved in setting 
‘the rules of the game’ in the face of ontological uncertainty so emphatically demonstrated by these 
crises – in combination with pressures for regime maintenance via performance legitimacy (cf. 
Alagappa 1995). 
   
Giving Islam a ‘Business Face’: The World Islamic Economic Forum  
The World Islamic Economic Forum originated from the OIC Business Forum, first held in 
Putrajaya (the seat of the Malaysian government) in 2003 in conjunction with the 10th OIC Leaders 
Summit. The OIC Business Forum was intended to ‘create a business “face” of the OIC’, strongly 
resonating with the ‘corporate Islam’ image pioneered by Malaysia since at least the early 1980s 
(WIEF 2016; see also Sloane-White 2011; 2017).20 A second forum was held in Kuala Lumpur in 
2004, where it was decided to broaden the focus and ‘open up the Forum to include Muslim 
communities beyond OIC countries and other non-Muslim communities across the globe’ (WIEF 
2016). In so doing, the WIEF is clearly outward facing, seeking to act as a bridge between the 
Muslim and non-Muslim world. 
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Organisationally, the World Islamic Economic Forum takes the form of a foundation, established 
in 2006 and headquartered in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Its main activity to date has been the 
organisation of the eponymous forum, an annual summit bringing together participants from 
government, business and civil society. The widely known World Economic Forum in Davos 
evidently served as an inspiration and the similarity in names is indeed no accident as the WIEF 
also emulates some of its other features (cf. Graz 2003; Pigman 2007; WEF 2009).21 Similar to the 
WEF, the WIEF is spearheading a number of additional initiatives, including the WIEF Education 
Trust, the WIEF Businesswomen Network, the WIEF Young Leaders Network and the WIEF 
Roundtable Series. 
  
The inaugural World Islamic Economic Forum (WIEF) took place in Kuala Lumpur in October 
2005. It was ‘aimed at providing a platform for dialogue and exchange of cutting-edge ideas, and 
business networking between government and business leaders across the Muslim world and 
beyond’ (WIEF 2016). Since then, the WIEF has been held annually, alternating between Malaysia 
and other sites.22 In 2008, the Forum was held for the first time in the Middle East (Kuwait). In 
2013, the Forum was held for the first time in a non-OIC member country (United Kingdom).  
 
The WIEF operates as a ‘ritualised form of interaction’ where the worlds of business and politics 
intersect (see also Garsten and Sorbom 2016, 18). Burke (2005, 38) draws attention to the dual 
signification of performance as ‘linked to evaluation’ and measurement and ‘performance in a 
more theatrical sense’. This duality of meaning runs through both the WIEF and the GIES. The 
forum is carefully staged. It opens with a recital of the Quran, followed by a heads of government 
‘leadership’ panel. Further highlights are the ‘CEO panel’ and the ‘face to face’ session with a 
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‘personality’ in the Muslim world. The program also includes a combination of panel discussions 
and masterclasses (including topics as varied as ‘halal haute cuisine cooking’ and ‘empowering 
women in e-commerce’ in 2016).  
 
Garsten and Sorbom (2016, 19) emphasize that the WEF is ‘not a decision-making body with a 
recognised mandate in the international political arena’; neither is the WIEF. However, different 
from the WEF, the organisers of the WIEF proudly point to the volume of deals and agreements 
signed at the sidelines of the forum (US$350 million in 2015). Early WIEFs sought to foster a 
common agenda aimed at moving the Islamic economy forward, such as creating a trade finance 
agency within the IDBG umbrella (established in 2007) or a global halal standards organisation 
(not much progress) – seeking to engage the OIC framework as interlocutor.23  
 
More recently, the focus has shifted more towards business networking. Consequently, in addition 
to the main forum, the WIEF provides space for business meetings, convenes sectoral business 
breakfasts and hosts an exhibition fair. In this sense, the visual politics of the WIEF have shifted 
from giving visibility to economic concerns (within the greater framework of Islamic global 
governance), to creating a specific image of ‘the relations between markets and politics’ (cf. 
Garsten and Sorbom 2016, 18) in the Muslim world where Islamic values and economic 
competitiveness and success are becoming increasingly aligned. Yet participants have also 
criticised how this – especially with Islamic finance as the success story - can ‘drown out’ essential 
discussions about the forces ‘for social change, for good’ (Irfan 2015).  
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Alongside the main forum, more recent features are the MOCAfest – the WIEF’s creative arts 
festival launched in 2007 to celebrate artistic diversity; and the IdeaPad, where young Muslim 
entrepreneurs can pitch their business ideas in front of an audience. In so doing, an Islamic 
‘entrepreneurial ethos’ is cultivated. Indeed, as has been suggested elsewhere, ‘[e]ntrepreneurship 
… is coming to be seen as the exemplary way of being a modern, moral Muslim’ (Osella and 
Osella as cited in Hoesterey 2016: 101). In a similar vein, FinTech has become an increasingly 
prominent issue on the WIEF agenda. 
 
If we once more draw a comparison between the WIEF and the WEF, then one important 
difference is that the WEF increasingly also acts as self-declared ‘knowledge hub’ (WEF 2009). 
Its flagship publication is the Global Competitiveness Report. Since 2004, it has been ranking 
countries according to its Global Competitiveness Index.24 Interestingly, a similar development is 
afoot in the Islamic economy, which takes us to the second case.  
 
Global Islamic Economy Summit and the State of the Global Islamic Economy Report 
Since 2013, the World Islamic Economic Forum has a ‘competitor’ in the form of the Dubai-based 
Global Islamic Economy Summit. The GIES is organised by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (established in 1963) and the Dubai Islamic Economy Development Centre 
(established in 2013). To date, three GIESs have taken place, in 2013, 2015 and 2016, all in 
Dubai.25 The GIES espouses seven ‘pillars’: Islamic finance, halal industry, family-friendly 
tourism, Islamic knowledge, Islamic fashion, arts & design, Islamic digital economy, and Islamic 
standards. The GIES thus adopts a more systematically comprehensive approach to the Islamic 
economy than the WIEF with its Islamic finance plus approach – with Malaysia’s globally 
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positioned Islamic finance sector at its core, complemented by location specific concerns (the 
smart city at the London forum, microenterprises at the Jakarta forum as I could observe). 
 
However, this more systemically comprehensive approach has its own challenges in terms of the 
economic moralities that are being performed. These tensions are particularly acute when it comes 
to the blurring of religious observance and revenue streams. Thus, for instance the ‘halal travel’ 
category is understood to consist of ‘hospitality, tourism, meetings incentives conferences & 
exhibitions (MICE), healthcare and Hajj/Umrah [pilgrimage/non-mandatory small pilgrimage]’. 
There exists a growing concern about the ‘marketisation’ of the pilgrimage, one of the five pillars 
of Islam and which all Muslims are expected to undertake at least once in their lifetime (see e.g. 
McLoughlin 2015 on British Muslims and the hajj). It is estimated that Hajj/Umrah related travel 
contributes 3 per cent to Saudi GDP, which makes it the second most important economic sector 
after oil and gas (Arab News, 5 January 2013; Saudi Gazette, 24 March 2016). 
 
Within a very short time frame, the GIES has become a key reference point in the Islamic economy, 
primarily because of the publication of the State of the Global Islamic Economy Report.26 The 
GIES collaborates with Thomson Reuters as ‘knowledge partner’ in its production as well as the 
research and advisory firm DinarStandard. Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn (2016) has argued that in 
the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-9, private Anglo-American ‘technology, information 
and news corporations’ such as Bloomberg, Dow Jones and indeed Thomson Reuters expanded 
into moral niche markets such as Islamic finance to reassert their ‘moral authority’. He suggests 
that this move was a response to challenges the crisis posed to their technical authority and thus 
more a strategy of self-legitimation rather than of deep ethical engagement. However, this does 
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not mean that their ‘ethical’ turn did not have any effects. From this perspective, perhaps more 
importantly, the SGIER creates a very specific representation of the Islamic economy as consumer 
segment.  
 
Thus, the SGIER provides information about the current size of various industries within the 
Islamic economy measured as Muslim spend, their five-year growth potential as well as the share 
of global markets (figure 1 above). The team behind the SGIER is very outspoken about its 
intentions: the release of the SGIER is nothing less than ‘a defining moment that touches the lives 
of 1.65 billion Muslims living across the world’. According to the authors, it is ‘defining the sectors 
of the Islamic economy … [an effort which] has its own intrinsic reality’ (Thomson Reuters 2013, 
5; emphasis added). Whilst the authors indicate in their foreword that this is not so much the 
ultimate characterisation of the Islamic economy, but one representation out of many, this nuance 
gets lost in the process of translation from the realms of market intelligence to economic and policy 
practice.  
 
The significance of these numbers – despite the underlying ambiguity of what precisely delineates 
the Islamic economy – should not be ignored as they equip marketing gurus, management 
consultants and even government officials with powerful tools to convince corporate leaders and 
country managers to expand their business ranges, and venture into and invest in these new 
markets. Indeed, in the five years since the SGIER has first been released, it has been used and 
cited across a wide range of fields, including in academia, business and government. 
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In 2014, the previously mentioned Global Islamic Economy Indicators were introduced (see figure 
2 above); they allow countries to benchmark their competitiveness in the Islamic economy. The 
indicators provide a simplified image of the complexities of what makes a ‘quality’ Islamic 
economy. In so doing, however, they also seek to demonstrate their commitment to Islamic 
principles. For example, the food score also assesses ‘social justice’ measured as level of food 
prices (a main reason why Australia and Brazil, the two biggest exporters of halal meat, are only 
ranked 4 and 6 in the 2015-16 report, Thomson Reuters 2015, 24). This concern with social justice, 
however, is made invisible – and thus erased - in the final score. 27  
 
The SGIER continues to provide information about the Islamic economy, but comparing the 2015-
16 and 2016-17 reports two things stand out in particular. The first is a subtle shift in language. 
Whereas in earlier iterations of the report, only halal food and Islamic banking and finance were 
labeled as such, now the other sectors also have been renamed to being halal (or in the case of 
fashion, modest) – this is despite the fact that the data presented mostly refers to estimates for total 
Muslim spend. The data also for the first time provides a further breakdown of certain figures. 
Thus, we learn that an estimated US$415 billion of food is halal certified, US$24 billion is spent 
on family travel and US$44 billion on modest fashion. Ultimately, this constitutes what Bergeaud-
Blackler (2015) in a slightly different context refers to as ‘halalisation’. Effectively, it signifies 
greater differentiation, but also tightening in the understanding of what it means to be halal, closely 
linked to the emergent regime of certification.28 However, it also shows how contradictory in itself 
the Islamic economy project can be. 
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Events such as the World Islamic Economic Forum and the Global Islamic Economy Summit and 
textual artifacts such as the State of the Global Islamic Economy Report reformat expanding  
Islamic economies of work and production, finance and consumption into a global Islamic 
economy. They represent a rescaling of economic governance that entails both ongoing 
negotiations between different sites of authority and expertise – be it state, market or the religious 
body of knowledge of sharia – as well as a politics of scale that crosses from the individual and 
privately held beliefs to the national, the regional and the global level and back. It is not simply a 
story of influence and control moving uniformly in one direction, for example from society to state 
or from state to market, but it is a highly uneven and partial and at times even contradictory process 
through which the Islamic economy is being made and remade. 
 
Conclusion 
Recent years have witnessed the rapid expansion of the Islamic economy. The growth of the 
Islamic economy presents an intriguing test case for the compatibility of global capitalism and 
moral – in this case specifically Islamic – values. This article adopted a performative lens to draw 
attention to the role of the World Islamic Economic Forum and the Global Islamic Economy 
Summit as legitimation mechanisms celebrating economic diversity and the success of Muslim 
entrepreneurs with the aim of increasing the visibility of the Islamic economy.  
Here, a polyphony of Muslim voices is sought to be consolidated into the voice of ‘business Islam’, 
with important implications for how the Islamic economy is conceived, defined and delineated. 
Indeed, performances of this type – and contemporary global economic governance (both Islamic 
and conventional) is riddled with them - play an important, if not constitutive, role in how 
economic realities are actualized, in this case the emergence of a global Islamic economy.  
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However, the article also pointed to instances of dissimilarity, deviance and defiance – in terms of 
the range of participants, sources of authority and scope for reasoning. On a wider scale, taking 
these sorts of performances seriously thus allows us to probe further the scripts, rituals and beliefs 
of capitalism that normalise, legitimise and make acceptable certain economic practices and 
delegitimise others. The growth of the Islamic economy has produced new configurations of 
political influence, intellectual authority and economic power that warrant further scrutiny. 
 
  
1 The 9th WIEF, held in London, attracted 18 heads of state and government, 46 ministers, seven central bank 
governors and 2700 delegates from 128 countries (WIEF 2013). 
2 See for example the opening speech by then UK prime minister David Cameron, in which he positions London 
alongside Kuala Lumpur and Dubai as one of the ‘great capitals of Islamic finance anywhere in the world’. The full 
speech can be accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/world-islamic-economic-forum-prime-
ministers-speech. 
3 Originally established as the Organisation of Islamic Conference, the OIC was renamed to Organisation for Islamic 
Cooperation in 2011. 
4 The 2016 Forum was attended by five heads of state, 12 ministers, the chairman of the Islamic Development Bank 
as well as 4080 delegates from 73 countries (WIEF 2016). 
5 For an early expose of the economic thinking behind these ambitions, see Maududi (1969).  
6 For example, Al-Andalus and Andalucian Routes are promoters of Islamic package tours, further information is 
available at: http://alandalus-experience.com/ and http://www.islamic-spain.com/.  
7 Other work emphasizes struggles over identity in this regard. For example, Aihwa Ong (1999, 357) suggests that in 
the context of Malaysia a ‘regime of renewed religious morality’ that emerged from the 1970s onwards is again 
challenged by the emergence of more ‘corporatist’ forms of Islam. She defines this as ‘vision of a corporate Islamic 
culture that promotes self-discipline, capital accumulation, and loyalty to the state’ (Ong 1999). 
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8 There even exists a company called Halal Inc., see: http://halalinc.com/index.shtml. Witnessing the shopping 
frenzy that surrounds annual religious celebrations such as Christmas or Eid al-Fitr, it is hard to deny the increasing 
commodification of religion. Indeed, a recent study estimates that the ‘socio-economic contribution of religion to 
American society’ ranges from somewhere between US$378 billion (the revenue of faith-based organisations) to 
US$4.8 trillion annually (the household income of religiously affiliated US Americans) (Grim and Grim 2016). 
9 For example, the 2016 State of the Global Islamic Economy Report draws on a universe of the 57 OIC countries as 
well as 16 other countries (Thomson Reuters 2016, 215). 
10 The paid-in capital of the IDB at inception was ID280 million with an authorised capital of ID2 billion (IDBG 
2013, vi). 
11 The IFSB originated in a consultative meeting of a group of Central Bank Governors, and officials from the IDB, 
the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) during the 2000 IMF/World Bank Annual Fall Meeting in Prague (Zeti 2002). 
12 In the first decade of its existence, the IDB dispersed a meagre US$5.6 billion, financing a total of 580 projects 
and operations (Mannan 1988, 174). 
13 In the decade from 2003 to 2013, IDB also tripled its subscribed capital which now stands at ID50 billion (US$ 75 
billion in 2013). Its authorised capital stands at ID100 billion (US$ 150 billion in 2013). For comparison, currently 
the subscribed capital of the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank stands at US$50 billion, its 
authorised capital at US$100 billion (Chan 2016). 
14 In the wake of the ‘global’ financial crisis, we have seen another spurt in the emergence of Islamic economic 
governance bodies. The International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM) is one such body, 
established in 2010 on the advice of the IFSB to issue sukuk to address the liquidity needs of internationally active 
Islamic financial institutions. The IDB is one of its currently ten shareholders. IILM presents a truly novel form of 
sovereign financial cooperation in the way that it incorporates market actors, namely its principal dealers. The rating 
of the IILM sukuk is dependent on their credit quality, rather than that of the participating sovereigns. It thus also 
provokes intriguing questions about the substitutability of political and market actors. Similarly, through its country 
partnership program, IDB has sought to develop a ‘reverse linkages initiative’, identifying areas in which it can learn 
from its member countries. In the case of Malaysia, it has identified the halal sector and Tabung Haji amongst others 
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as such areas. This is not to mention similar examples in areas such as trade and tourism, for which also exist OIC 
frameworks of sorts. 
15 Muslim-majority countries such as Egypt require the halal certification of meat imports. There exists a huge 
variety when it comes to certification requirements and the mutual recognition of certification schemes – which 
poses intriguing questions for International Political Economy scholars interested in contemporary configurations of 
private/public authority. This is different from Islamic finance, where over the last fifteen years a more coordinated 
standard setting regime has emerged.  
In 2014, OIC countries imported 85 per cent of their meat and livestock, most of it from non-Muslim majority 
countries, indicating ‘a very high need for halal food production certification and logistics integrity’ (My Salaam, 4 
December 2016). 
16 Ijtihad (deliberative reasoning) is an important mechanism in Islamic law. It has become increasingly implicated 
in debates about control, evolving for example around the question of whether lay persons/women can participate in 
ijtihad or whether it should be restricted to (mainly male) Islamic scholars (see also Elder 2017).  
17 Bergeaud-Blackler (2015) distinguishes two other uses of ‘halal’, halal théologique (les usages savant) and halal 
comme qualité (les usages marchands). 
18 The five volume Voices of Islam series that Cornell has edited includes volumes on tradition; spirit; life (family, 
home and society); art, beauty and science; and change. 
19 In her eponymous book Corporate Islam, Sloane-White (2017, 2) offers a rich ethnography of ‘modern 
corporations as sites of Islamic expression, expansion and uniformity in Muslim Malaysia where power, 
relationships, individual identities, and practices – and often financial resources – are mobilized on behalf of Islam’.   
20 Note however, that within the OIC framework there already existed a number of outlets aimed at reaching out to 
the private sector and foster public-private cooperation (Ihsanolgu 2009, 17-19). One of them is the already 
mentioned ICCI, which is tasked with organising annual private sector meetings, the results of which have been 
considered by COMCEC since 1993. By 2008, ICCI had organised 12 such meetings. Along these lines, Islamic 
trade fairs have been held since 1979, their organisation assigned to the ICDT in collaboration with country hosts. 
After a slow start, since 1994, these fairs have taken place biannually. In 2001, ICDT was asked to also organise 
tourism fairs. However, overall these efforts at private sector involvement are mainly directed at ‘increasing intra-
OIC trade flows and transactions’ (Ihsanoglu 2009, 19); their impact has at best been very limited. 
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21 In contrast, the World Social Forum (WSF), established in 2001, although again clearly taking inspiration for its 
name from the WEF, has adopted a very different organisational structure. Its summits also follow a different logic 
with regard to how they are staged and scripted, which some authors claim enables the WSF to approximate more 
closely the ideal type of a public deliberative space. 
22 WIEF locations to date have been: Kuala Lumpur (2005, 2007, 2010, 2015), Jakarta (2009, 2016), Astana (2011), 
Dubai (2014), Islamabad (2006), Johor Baru (2012) and Kuching (2017) as well as the ones already mentioned.   
23 However, in 2016, the International Halal Accreditation Forum was created. This initiative was spearheaded by 
the Dubai Islamic Economy Development Centre and the Emirates Authority for Standardization and Metrology. 
24 The Report is one of two main competitiveness rankings against which country managers benchmark their 
performance, the other being the IMD World Competitiveness Ranking. See Broome ad Quirk (2015) for a succinct 
critique of global benchmarking practices.  
25 In 2014, a workshop was held. 
26 Thomson Reuters also hosts the online portal ‘mysalaam.com’, which is ‘designed … as a business-to-business 
tool for the increasingly Shariah-sensitive Muslim professional’. It has recently been renamed Salaam Gateway and 
can now be accessed at salaamgateway.com. 
27 Other measures of the ‘social’ are: zakat (alms tax) and corporate social responsibility disclosure (finance), 
employment (travel sector), pricing/labour fairness (modest fashion), internet access (media and recreation). The 
pharmaceuticals and cosmetics score also uses pricing as social justice indicator. Obviously, these categories are not 
uncontroversial as measures of social justice. 
28 The 2016-17 report introduces another dimension that deserves further attention but falls outside the scope of this 
article. It makes strategic use of big data analytics as part of its new ‘social listening’ framework - quantified piety 
drawn from Facebook data (Thomson Reuters 2016, 16-19). 
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